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In early December, the U.S. President brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace agreement. His pledge was an end to decades of conflict in the unstable eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

These divergent actions highlights the central principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and stopping hostilities—despite the fact that this fits with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a senior U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative stated this, commenting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Contradictions

This pivot is significant, but analysts note it is early to assess its effects. The approach is complicated by the President’s direct manner, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study estimates this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Neglect and Strains

In contrast to his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable comment on African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major dispute has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Diplomacy and Targeted Intervention

A comparable standoff appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the harsh rhetoric may have prompted the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.